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Abstract  
The elasticity of taxable income (ETI) is a key parameter in income tax analysis 
both in terms of efficiency and tax revenue. This paper uses Finnish panel data to 
analyze ETI. I use changes in flat municipal income tax rates as an instrument for 
overall changes in marginal tax rates. This instrument is not a function of 
individual income, which is the basis for an exogenous instrument. In general, 
instruments used in previous studies do not have this feature. My preferred 
estimate for the average ETI is 0.16. The preferred specification includes 
extensive regional and individual controlling. 
Earlier version of this paper was published in February 2014 ("Taxable income 
elasticity and the anatomy of behavioral response: Evidence from Finland" 
Government Institute for Economic Research (VATT) Working Papers 55). 
 
 
Key words: elasticity of taxable income, income taxation 
JEL classes: H21, H24, J22 
 
Tiivistelmä  
Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan verotettavan tulon joustoa (elasticity of taxable 
income) Suomessa vuosina 1995–2007. Verotettavan tulon jousto on keskeinen 
tekijä verotuksen taloudellisen tehokkuuden ja veronmuutosten vaikutusten 
arvioinnissa. Verotettavan tulon jousto mittaa sitä, kuinka paljon tuloverotuksen 
veropohja eli verotettava tulo keskimäärin muuttuu, kun yhdestä lisäeurosta 
käteen jäävä osuus (1-rajaveroaste) muuttuu yhden prosentin. Korkeampi 
rajaveroaste voi esimerkiksi vähentää tehtyjä työtunteja sekä lisätä 
verosuunnittelua ja verovähennysten käyttöä. Verotettavan tulon jousto huomioi 
eri kanavat joilla tuloverotukseen voidaan reagoida.  
  
 
Tutkimuksessa hyödynnetään kunnallisveroprosenteissa tapahtuneita muutoksia 
veroastevaihtelun lähteenä. Kunnallisverotus tarjoaa hyvän vertailuasetelman, 
sillä kunnallisveroprosentit ovat muuttuneet eri tavalla eri puolella Suomea eri 
vuosina. Lisäksi kunnallisveroprosentti ei riipu henkilön tuloista, joten 
kunnallisveroprosentin muutokset aiheuttavat muutoksia rajaveroasteissa kaikissa 
tuloluokissa.  
Tulosten perusteella verotettavan tulon jousto on Suomessa keskimäärin noin 
0,15. Tulosta voidaan tulkita siten, että tuloverotuksen kiristäminen 
(keventäminen) pienentää (kasvattaa) verotettavaa tuloa tilastollisesti 
merkitsevällä tavalla, mutta tuloverotuksen aiheuttama hyvinvointitappio on 
kokonaisuudessaan maltillinen.  
Tutkimuksen aikaisempi versio on julkaistu VATT:n Working Papers-sarjassa 
helmikuussa 2014 ("Taxable income elasticity and the anatomy of behavioral 
response: Evidence from Finland" Government Institute for Economic Research 
(VATT) Working Papers 55). 
  
Asiasanat: Tuloverotus, verotettavan tulon jousto, hyvinvointitappio 
JEL-luokat: H21, H24, J22 
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1 Introduction
The elasticity of taxable income (ETI) with respect to the net-of-tax rate (one minus the marginal
income tax rate) is a key tax policy parameter and an important element in the efficiency analysis
of income taxation. The practical significance of ETI is straightforward: it measures how a one
percent change in the net-of-tax rate affects taxable income. Intuitively, the more elastic taxable
income is, the larger the behavioral response to a tax reform will be, in terms of a change in the tax
base. Therefore, good knowledge of ETI is essential when deciding on national tax reforms.
Furthermore, ETI measures the overall marginal excess burden of income taxation (Feldstein (1995,
1999), Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2012)). In addition to labor supply responses, ETI covers other
decisions in response to income taxation, such as effort and productivity, deduction behavior, tax
evasion and tax avoidance. All behavioral responses reflect the inefficiency of the income tax, and
thus different behavioral margins are all important when considering the overall efficiency of the
income tax system.
This paper studies ETI using Finnish register data from 1995-2007. I use changes in flat municipal
income tax rates as instruments for the changes in overall net-of-tax rates. This instrument is not
based on individual income, which provides the basis for an exogenous instrument. In contrast, pre-
vious ETI studies typically use instruments that are a function of taxable income. Recent literature
highlights that these so-called predicted net-of-tax rate instruments are not necessarily exogenous
(Weber (2014), Blomquist and Selin (2010)). This paper proposes an alternative strategy of utilizing
institutional features of the tax system to derive an instrument for individual tax rate changes. To
my knowledge, this paper is the first to use this type of an instrument to estimate ETI.
In general, variation in tax rates and the endogeneity of the net-of-tax rate variable are the main
issues to focus on when estimating ETI using panel data. Identification requires variation in income
tax rates that is different for individuals with otherwise similar income trends. Also, due to the
progressive income tax rate schedule, a valid instrument for the net-of-tax rate is necessary in order
to derive a consistent elasticity estimator. In this study I use variation in municipal-level income
tax rates for both purposes.
Finnish municipal income taxation has appealing features from the point of view of empirical ETI
analysis. First, the municipal income tax rate is flat, which means that it is independent of individual
income level. This is the basis for using changes in municipal tax rates as an instrument for changes
in individual net-of-tax rates. Second, differential tax rate variation caused by municipal tax rate
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changes covers the entire income distribution. This improves the identification of the average ETI
while avoiding some of the typical difficulties in ETI estimation, such as non-tax-related changes in
the shape of the income distribution and the mean reversion of income. Third, there is very limited
tax rate variation available for individuals at different income levels in Finland. This indicates that
changes in municipal tax rates provide the main source of identifying tax rate variation to estimate
the average ETI in Finland.
However, even though municipal tax rate changes do not depend on individual income, changes in
municipal income tax rates are not randomly assigned to individuals. Municipalities might change
their tax rates based on, for example, previous trends in average taxable income in their jurisdiction,
which might affect the validity of the instrument. In the paper I provide compelling graphical
evidence showing that this type of policy endogeneity is not driving the results. Second, I include
different combinations of year and regional fixed effects and municipal-level characteristics (e.g.
unemployment and employment rates, municipal debt per capita etc.) in the estimable equation in
order to take into account potential regional differences in income trends.
My preferred average ETI estimate is 0.16. The preferred empirical specification includes extensive
regional and individual controlling. In addition, as in many earlier studies, the average ETI is slightly
larger for women than for men. Also, I find that ETI is somewhat larger for low-income individuals
compared to middle and high-income individuals.
In addition, I characterize the structure of the overall response by estimating the elasticity of various
subcomponents of ETI, such as labor supply and tax deductions. The analysis of the subcomponents
of ETI is useful when designing the income tax system, especially in the light of minimizing the excess
burden. Also, it gives information on the economic nature of the response. The results give tentative
evidence that both work effort (wage rates) and labor supply (working hours) are not responsive to
tax rate changes. However, more irregular components, such as fringe benefits and tax deductions,
appear to be more responsive.
The empirical ETI literature has grown substantially following the pioneering studies by Feldstein
(1995, 1999). Feldstein (1995) uses panel data to analyze behavioral responses to the 1986 income
tax reform in the US. He estimates ETI to be large, ranging from 1-3, depending on the specification
used. Many following studies focus on improving the elasticity estimation by paying more attention
to the net-of-tax rate instrument and non-tax-related changes in the income distribution. Along with
these modifications, ETI estimates decreased markedly compared to those in Feldstein (1995). A
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wide range of studies report elasticity estimates ranging from 0 to 0.6. For example, the widely cited
Gruber and Saez (2002) study reports the ETI of 0.2 for middle-income earners and 0.6 for high-
income earners in the US. An extensive review of earlier empirical results from the US is presented
in a recent survey by Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2012).
More recent papers further study the reliability and consistency of the estimation by utilizing differ-
ent tax reforms and different net-of-tax rate instruments. This literature underlines that different
tax reforms and more consistent estimation strategies yield different estimates than the seminal con-
tribution of Gruber and Saez (2002). In particular, it has been shown that the widely-used predicted
net-of-tax rate instruments are not consistent due to potential endogeneity problems. For example,
Weber (2014) shows that when using a more robust instrumentation strategy, the ETI estimates are
approximately twice as large compared to Gruber and Saez (2002).
A majority of earlier empirical studies estimate ETI using US data sets, while studies concerning
European countries and other regions are less common. In particular, there are no earlier Finnish
ETI studies available to this day, and thus this paper is the first to comprehensively analyze ETI
in Finland. Nevertheless, Pirttilä and Uusitalo (2005) approximate ETI in Finland. Their results
suggest that average ETI is around 0.3.
Other Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway, Denmark) provide the closest comparison group to Fin-
land in terms of the similarity of the tax system and the overall institutional and cultural framework.
Kleven and Schultz (2014) use extensive panel data and many tax reforms to analyze ETI in Den-
mark. In general, they obtain a modest average ETI estimate of 0.12. Also, Chetty et al. (2011)
report small elasticity estimates using Danish data. Blomquist and Selin (2010) estimate ETI of
around 0.20 for males and 1 for females in Sweden. For Norway, Aarbu and Thoresen (2001) find
only small responses to tax rate changes. They report that ETI is not significantly different from
zero. In a more recent paper, Thoresen and Vattø (2013) report elasticities below 0.1 for Norway.
Finally, in addition to previous ETI analysis, this paper relates to other studies that exploit regional
within-country variation in tax rates to identify individual-level elasticities. For example, a recent
study utilizes changes in municipal-level corporate tax rates to analyze the effect of the corporate
tax rate on wages in Germany (Fuest, Peichl and Siegloch (2014)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the conceptual framework. Section 3
describes the Finnish income tax system and recent changes in income tax rates. Section 4 introduces
the data and discusses identification issues. Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 concludes.
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2 Conceptual framework
The basic idea of the taxable income model is that an individual receives positive utility from
consumption c and negative utility from creating and reporting taxable income TI (Feldstein (1999)).
Compared to the standard labor supply model, taxable income is generated by various decisions,
such as hours of work, work effort, deduction behavior, tax avoidance and tax evasion. Following
Piketty et al. (2014), the quasi-linear utility function u(c, T I) = c− h(TI) is maximized under the
budget constraint c = TI(1−τ)+R. The convex cost function of creating taxable income is denoted
as h(TI), and (1 − τ) denotes the net-of-tax rate on a linear segment of the tax rate schedule. R
denotes virtual income. Maximization of the utility function with respect to the budget constraint
gives the supply function of taxable income of the form TI = TI((1− τ)).
Next, consider a marginal decrease in (1 − τ). With quasi-linear utility with no income effects,
the decreased net-of-tax rate decreases the supply of taxable income. Thus we get the following
expression
dTI
TI
= e
d(1− τ)
(1− τ) (1)
where e is the elasticity of taxable income.
Next I briefly describe the general empirical methodology of estimating ETI using tax reforms and
individual-level panel data.1 In short, the idea is to measure how the net-of-tax rate affects the
taxable income of an individual. Within this study, taxable income is regarded as taxable earned
income. Taxable earned income is defined as the sum of labor income and taxable non-labor income
minus deductions (verotettava tulo). The legal distinction between earned income and capital income
in the Finnish income tax system is briefly described in the next section
The ETI model can be described as
ln(TI)t,i = e ∗ ln(1− τ)t,i + ln(µ)t,i + ln(λ)i + ln(δ)t + ln(ε)t,i (2)
where i denotes the index for individual and t for time. TIt,i is taxable income and (1−τ)t,i is the net-
of-tax rate, and e denotes the average ETI. µt,i denotes other time-variant individual characteristics
that affect the income level, and λi is a matrix of time-invariant individual characteristics. δt is the
general time trend and εt,i is the individual error term, including the transitory income component.
1For a comprehensive discussion of ETI estimation, including cross-sectional approaches, see Saez et al. (2012).
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As in most earlier ETI studies, I assume no income effects. Earlier literature shows that income
effects are either insignificant or very small (Saez et al. (2012)). Thus in the empirical analysis, ETI
is measured by regressing changes in taxable income with changes in the net-of-tax rate.
In practice, it is difficult to identify the average ETI using equation (2). Innate ability and many
other time-invariant individual characteristics are unobserved, and at the same time correlated with
the progressive tax rate τ . Therefore, in the presence of an income tax reform, one practical approach
is to use a first-differences estimator of the form
ln(TI)t+k,i − ln(TI)t,i =αt + e(ln(1− τ)t+k,i − ln(1− τ)t,i)+
(ln(µ)t+k,i − ln(µ)t,i) + (ln(ε)t+k,i − ln(εt,i))
(3)
Now, t + k represents the post-reform period, and t represents the pre-reform period. In equation
(3), time-invariant individual characteristics are canceled out by definition.
There are many issues that need to be considered before we can achieve a reliable estimate of ETI
using equation (3). These are widely discussed in the empirical ETI literature (see Saez et al. (2012)).
First, the net-of-tax rate is still endogenous. (ln(1− τ)t+k,i− ln(1− τ)t,,i) and (ln(ε)t+k,i− ln(ε)t,i)
are mechanically correlated due to the progressive nature of the tax rate schedule (i.e. higher taxable
income is taxed at higher marginal tax rates). Second, a positive income shock in year t tends to
be followed by lower income in the next period t+ k, and vice versa. This so-called mean reversion
of income combined with the progressive tax rate schedule bias the elasticity estimate. In addition,
non-tax-related changes in the shape of the income distribution need to be taken into account.
In particular, if variation in net-of-tax rates is concentrated only in a certain part of the income
distribution, income growth trends in different parts of the distribution must be carefully controlled
for.
Endogeneity of the net-of-tax rate can be corrected by using an instrumental variable estimator.
This obviously requires a valid instrumental variable. Non-tax-related changes in income are usually
controlled for by adding variants of lagged taxable income and other individual-level characteristics
to the model. Rich individual panel data sets might also allow for controlling the transitory elements
of income. I discuss these issues in more detail in Section 4.
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3 Finnish income tax system and recent changes in tax rates
3.1 Institutional setting
In Finland, earned income is taxed according to a progressive tax rate schedule.2 There are three
levels of earned income taxation: central government (or state-level) income taxes, municipal in-
come taxes, and mandatory social security contributions. All taxes and social security contributions
are administered centrally in an integrated system by the Finnish Tax Administration. Therefore,
municipal taxes are not collected by the municipalities, and individual gross income and deductions
subject to income taxation are reported for both central government and municipal taxation using
the same tax return form. In general, the Finnish income tax system follows the principle of indi-
vidual taxation. The income of a spouse or other family member does not affect the tax rate of an
individual. However, some tax deductions and received social security depend on the total income
of the household.
The central government income tax rate schedule is progressive. The nominal central government
income tax rate varies from 0 to 32%, depending on taxable income. All tax rates presented in this
section are from 2007 if not stated otherwise. Central government income tax schedule is presented
in more detail in the next subsection. Social security contributions are proportional. Social security
contributions include, for example, mandatory pension contributions and unemployment insurance
payments. The average rate of social security contributions is approximately 5%.
Municipal income tax rates are flat. The average nominal municipal tax rate is 18.45%. All income
earners are subject to municipal income taxation, with the exception of individuals with very low
earned income who are exempt from all taxes. Recent changes in municipal tax rates are described
in the next subsection.
There were 416 municipalities in Finland in 2007. Municipalities have autonomous authority to levy
income tax. Municipal council elections are held in every four years at the same time throughout the
country, and each democratically elected municipal council decides and announces the municipal in-
come tax rate on an annual basis. Figure 5 in the Appendix presents a map of Finnish municipalities
in 2007.
There are certain public services and legislative duties each municipality has to offer and fulfill.
2Since 1993, Finland has applied the principle of Nordic-type dual income taxation, where earned income (wages,
fringe benefits, pensions etc.) and capital income (interest income, capital gains, dividends from listed corporations
etc.) are taxed separately. The capital income tax rate is flat. As is typical in a dual income tax system, the top
marginal tax rate on earned income (54%) is higher than the flat tax rate on capital income (28%). Harju and Matikka
(2014) present an ETI analysis of capital income and dividend taxation of Finnish business owners.
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These include, for example, public health care and social services. These commitments are partly
financed by municipal income taxation.3 The structure and framework of municipal income taxation,
including the flatness of the tax rate and the tax deductions and allowances, are regulated at the
central government level. Apart from the need for a certain amount of municipal tax revenue for
legislative duties, and the limitations to alter the frame rules of municipal taxation, municipalities
can set their income tax rates freely. As a demonstration of this argument, there is a 5 percentage-
point difference between the highest (21%) and lowest (16%) municipal income tax rate in 2007.
3.2 Recent changes in income tax rates
Central government income taxation. I focus on analyzing the behavioral effects of changes
in earned income taxation that occurred in 1995-2007, since the data I use cover this time period.
From the mid-1990s onwards, there has been a general decline in central government income tax
rates in Finland. Central government tax rates have decreased almost every year in all income
classes. Figure 1 illustrates the changes in average marginal tax rates between the years 1995, 2001
and 2007. These marginal tax rates are calculated with the average municipal income tax rate and
social security contributions in the year in question. Table 4 in the Appendix presents the marginal
tax rate schedule of central government income taxation in 1995-2007.
From the empirical point of view, variation stemming from changes in central government tax rates
is not ideal. Although there have been significant changes in tax rates over this time period, the
generally declining nature of tax rates does not provide much differential marginal tax rate variation.
In relative terms, marginal tax rates declined slightly more for low and middle wage income, whereas
the relative decrease was smaller in the top income bracket. This creates only small-scale variation
in time in marginal tax rates for individuals at different income levels.
Municipal income taxation. Compared to central government income taxes, changes in munic-
ipal income tax rates have been different in nature. In Finland, municipal tax rates have changed
differently in different municipalities in different years. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics
of municipal-level tax rate changes. Depending on the year, 10-30% of municipalities have changed
3In addition to municipal income tax revenue, the less well-off municipalities receive benefits through local tax-
sharing and grants from central government. However, these are not directly related to the municipal income tax rate
in the municipality in question. For example, the degree of tax-sharing depends on the industrial and demographic
structure of the municipality. Within certain limits, municipalities can also charge usage fees for statutory public
services, and assign low real estate taxes. In addition, part of the corporate tax revenue collected by central government
is assigned to municipalities.
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Notes: Figure presents average marginal income tax rates at different income levels in 1995, 2001 and 2007. Marginal tax rates
are calculated using average municipal income tax rates and employee social security contributions in each year. Employer
pension insurance contributions are excluded.
Figure 1: Average marginal tax rates in 1995, 2001 and 2007
their tax rate. On average, every fifth municipality has changed its tax rate in each year. In all of
the years in 1995-2007, at least one municipality has decreased its tax rate, and one has increased
it.
One-year municipal-level tax rate changes vary from -1 to +1.5 percentage points. The average
absolute change is approximately 0.5 percentage points. On average, municipal tax rates increased
within the time period of 1995-2007. The average municipal income tax rate increased from 17.5%
in 1995 to 18.45% in 2007.
There have also been a number of mergers (or consolidations) of two or more neighboring munici-
palities. Within a merger, the merged municipalities form a new municipality and decide on a new
municipal tax rate. As a consequence of mergers, the total number of municipalities decreased from
455 to 416 in 1995-2007. Table 1 does not include tax rate changes caused by municipal mergers.
A more detailed discussion on using the individual-level municipal income tax rate variation in the
empirical analysis is deferred until Section 4.2.
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Year Mean
absolute
change in
municipal
tax rate
(%points)
Std. Dev. Min
change
(%
points)
Max
change
(%
points)
Percent
of munic-
ipalities
with a
change in
tax rate
Average
municipal
income
tax rate
1995 0.413 0.166 - 1 0.5 8.9 17.53
1996 0.495 0.220 -1 1 12.0 17.51
1997 0.557 0.207 - 1 1 21.2 17.42
1998 0.548 0.225 - 0.5 1 21.9 17.53
1999 0.558 0.242 - 1 1 21.9 17.60
2000 0.533 0.208 - 1 1 10.3 17.65
2001 0.565 0.219 - 0.5 1.5 25.0 17.67
2002 0.551 0.200 - 0.5 1 20.8 17.78
2003 0.481 0.154 - 0.25 1 11.9 18.04
2004 0.553 0.207 - 0.25 1 31.4 18.12
2005 0.586 0.217 - 0.5 1 31.1 18.29
2006 0.576 0.266 - 0.5 1.5 27.0 18.39
2007 - - - - - 18.45
Overall 0.548 0.220 - 1 1.5 18.7 17.84
Notes: Table presents descriptive statistics on one-year changes in municipal income tax rates from 1995-2007. Table does not
include municipal mergers.
Table 1: Municipal income tax rate changes, 1995-2007
4 Data and identification
4.1 Data
I use individual-level panel data from 1995-2007, provided by Statistics Finland. The data set
consists of approximately 550,000 observations per year, which constitute a representative sample of
roughly 10% of the Finnish population. The data contain a wide variety of individual-level variables
from different administrative registers. The main statistics used in this study are the personal tax
record information provided by the Finnish Tax Administration, the Structure of Earnings statistics
collected by Statistics Finland, and available municipal-level statistics.
The data set contains all the necessary information to study the elasticity of taxable income, and
a substantial amount of individual and municipal-level control variables. Table 6 in the Appendix
presents the summary statistics of the key variables used in this study for individuals between 25-60
years of age, including register-based variables on monthly wages, monthly working hours and tax
deductions. Table 6 also includes the descriptive statistics for the key municipal-level variables.
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4.2 Individual tax rate variation
The key issues in identifying ETI is the source of variation in net-of-tax rates. In short, differential
variation in net-of-tax rates for otherwise similar individuals is needed when estimating ETI using
individual-level panel data and tax reforms. I use changes in municipal income tax rates as the main
source of this variation.4
Compared to many of the earlier ETI studies, municipal tax rate variation has some very appealing
features. First, municipal tax rate changes occur in all of the years in the data (1995-2007). There
are also both increases and decreases in municipal tax rates in all of the years. Second, changes
in municipal tax rates affect individuals throughout the income distribution. Thus, in all income
classes there are some individuals whose municipal income tax rate has changed, and some individuals
faced no changes in municipal income taxation. These significantly alleviate the potential problems
associated with non-tax-related changes in the income distribution, which are critical in many earlier
studies that utilize changes in tax rates that occur only at certain income levels in certain years (for
example one-time tax rate cuts of high-income individuals). In addition, tax rate variation across
the whole income distribution identifies the parameter of main interest, the average elasticity of
taxable income.
Figure 2 presents the actual individual marginal income tax rates at different income levels, highlight-
ing the regional variation in marginal income tax rates. As can be seen from the Figure, individuals
at the same income level face different marginal tax rates depending on the municipality of residence.
Moreover, individuals with the same income level face different changes in overall marginal tax rates
due to differential changes in municipal tax rates over time.
Table 2 describes the overall individual variation in municipal income tax rates. In addition to
tax rate changes within a municipality, Table 2 includes individuals who faced a change in their
municipal tax rate as a result of a change in their municipality of residence, or as a consequence of a
merger of two or more neighboring municipalities. In the data set, 3.3% of individuals changed their
municipality of residence between t and t + 1 (on average). This number does not include mergers
of municipalities.
As can be seen from Table 2, approximately every fifth individual experienced a change in his/her
municipal income tax rate each year. On average, the absolute change in the municipal tax rate was
0.6 percentage points for those individuals who faced a change in their municipal tax rate. There
4To my knowledge, Pirttilä and Uusitalo (2005) first proposed the use of municipal income tax rate changes as a
source of differential income tax rate variation in Finland.
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Notes: Figure presents marginal income tax rates at different income levels in 2007. Marginal tax rates are calculated using
actual municipal income tax rates, tax deductions and allowances, and employee social security contributions in each year.
Employer pension insurance contributions are excluded. Marginal tax rates are calculated using an own simulation program
suited for this data set, build on the basis of the Finnish JUTTA microsimulation model.
Figure 2: Actual marginal tax rates in 2007, including individual municipal income tax rates
is a more distinctive difference between the smallest negative (-4.25 percentage points) and largest
positive (3.75 percentage points) change in the municipal tax rate. The largest absolute changes are
caused by changes in the municipality of residence. Figure 3 in Section 4.4 describes the extent of the
variation for three-year difference and the baseline estimation sample excluding moving individuals.
Individual changes in municipal income tax rates are not extensive in size. The majority of changes
are between +/- 0.25-1 percentage points. When the whole net-of-tax rate is accounted for (municipal
taxes + central government taxes + social security contributions), most of the changes are around
+/- 1-10 as a percentage. The largest changes in municipal tax rates correspond to changes in overall
net-of-tax rates of +/- 5-15%.
Some recent studies (e.g. Chetty (2012), Kleven and Schultz (2014)) argue that optimization frictions
have an effect on the estimated taxable income elasticity. In short, if costs related to responding to
tax rate changes (adjustment costs, job search costs, paying attention to tax code etc.) are large,
they might attenuate the observed elasticities and make them less than the structural elasticities
derived in a frictionless benchmark case.
Frictions are typically more relevant when changes in the tax rate schedule are small. Small tax
rate changes might induce only small utility benefits from changing behavior, and this utility gain
might be smaller than the associated (fixed) cost. Thus small changes in tax rates tend to lead
11
Year Mean
absolute
change in
municipal
tax rate
(%points)
Std. Dev. min
change
of
munic.
tax
rate (%
points)
max
change
of
munic.
tax
rate (%
points)
Percent
of indi-
viduals
with a
change in
municipal
tax rate
1995 0.533 0.331 -3.25 3.75 9.6
1996 0.508 0.250 -3.25 3.5 22.2
1997 0.632 0.272 -3 2.75 24.2
1998 0.601 0.289 -3 3.5 20.4
1999 0.564 0.307 -3.25 3.75 17.5
2000 0.608 0.341 -3.75 3.5 11.7
2001 0.605 0.291 -3.25 3.25 23.4
2002 0.716 0.301 -3 3.5 30.6
2003 0.581 0.243 -2.75 3.0 17.7
2004 0.634 0.246 -3.5 3.25 29.7
2005 0.596 0.260 -3.5 3 22.2
2006 0.599 .0316 -4.25 3.75 15.2
Overall 0.608 0.288 -4.25 3.75 18.7
Notes: Table presents descriptive statistics on one-year changes in individual municipal income tax rates from 1995-2007. Table
includes changes caused by municipal mergers and moving to another municipality.
Table 2: Individual-level changes in municipal tax rates, 1995-2007
to smaller changes in observed behavior (on average).5 This is a valid point in this setup, as the
variation in overall net-of-tax rates is relatively small, at least when compared to many earlier
studies. Therefore, assuming that adjustment costs or other frictions matter, we would expect to
get smaller ETI estimates in this study.
In addition, it might be that the short-run response to a small change in the net-of-tax rate differs
significantly from the longer-run effect. For example, the adjustment process might take more than
1-3 years, particularly if the short-run gains from the behavioral response are relatively small. In
the empirical part, I test the effect of changing the time horizon on the elasticity estimate.
Finally, as highlighted by Kopczuk (2005), changes in the tax base and the definition of taxable
income affect the ETI estimate. In Finland, the earned income tax base has remained relatively
constant in 1995-2007. Furthermore, the minor changes in the tax base are to a large extent unrelated
to the main source of tax rate variation. This is due to the fact that the tax base and basic rules
of municipal income taxation, including tax deductions and allowances, are regulated at the central
government level.
5Using Danish data, Chetty et al. (2011) and Kleven and Schultz (2014) show evidence that the observed elasticity
estimate depends positively on the size of the change in the net-of-tax rate.
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4.3 Net-of-tax rate instrument
In a progressive income tax rate schedule, the marginal tax rate increases as taxable income increases.
Therefore, a change in taxable income endogenously defines the change in the net-of-tax rate, and
thus a valid instrumental variable for (1− τ) is required.
A common strategy in the earlier literature is to simulate predicted (or synthetic) net-of-tax rates,
and use them as instruments for the actual net-of-tax rate changes (see Gruber and Saez (2002)).
The basic structure of the predicted net-of-tax rate instrument is the following: take base-year t
income and use it to predict the net-of-tax rate for t + k by using tax legislation in t + k. The
instrument for the change in the net-of-tax rate is then the difference between the actual net-of-tax
rate in t and the net-of-tax rate calculated with income in t and the tax law for t+ k. The intuition
is that the predicted difference describes the exogenous change in the tax rate caused by changes in
tax legislation, ignoring any behavioral effects by keeping taxable income constant at the base-year
level.
However, the predicted net-of-tax rate variable is a function of individual taxable income in year t,
and there is no proof that this instrument is exogenous in the empirical model. Following Blomquist
and Selin (2010) and Moffit and Wilhelm (2000), it is unlikely that the predicted net-of-tax rate
instrument is correlated similarly with both εt+k,i and εt,i in equation (3), as taxable income in year
t defines the marginal tax rate in both t and t + k. In addition, there is no general proof that the
usually added controls, mainly base-year taxable income, correct this endogeneity problem (Weber
(2014)). In all occasions there is concern about the validity of instruments that are functions of the
dependent variable.6
In this study I use an instrument for net-of-tax rate changes which is not a function of taxable
income, namely changes in flat municipal income tax rates. As the municipal income tax rate is
flat, the tax rate is the same in all income classes within each municipality. In other words, at
the individual level, the only determinant of the municipal income tax rate is the municipality of
residence.7
6In Blomquist and Selin (2010), the middle-year characteristics (i.e. (t + (t + k))/2) are used to define imputed
taxable income for both t and t + k, from which the net-of-tax rate instrument is then calculated. Blomquist and
Selin (2010) show that this strategy produces exogenous instruments under certain general assumptions about the
autoregressive structure of the transitory income component. Weber (2014) shows that using lagged income (t − 1,
t − 2 etc.) enhances the validity of the predicted instrument. Nevertheless, the validity of these types of predicted
net-of-tax rate instruments still depends on the serial correlation pattern of εt,i.
7The earned income tax allowance in municipal taxation depends (inversely) on earned income. This mainly affects
low-income individuals. The effect of the allowance on the effective overall net-of-tax rate is trivial for taxable income
over 14,000 euros. The earned income tax allowance in municipal taxation is described in Table 5 in the Appendix.
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Compared to predicted net-of-tax rate instruments, the municipal tax rate instrument has several
advantages. First, I do not have to make assumptions about the time structure of the individual
transitory income component in order to ensure the exogeneity of the instrument. Second, as mu-
nicipal income tax rates affect the net-of-tax rates in all income classes, I do not have to explicitly
control for the non-tax-related changes in the income distribution in order to guarantee the causal-
ity of the behavioral parameter. Third, mean reversion does not pose a notable problem, as yearly
fluctuation in individual income does not affect the instrument.
However, even though the municipal tax rate instrument is not a direct function of the dependent
variable in any period, there are some concerns that the instrument might not be exogenous as such.
One concern is the possible policy endogeneity of municipal tax rate changes. Municipalities might
increase tax rates because of decreased tax revenue. For example, this could be caused by decreased
employment in the jurisdiction. Because low employment might also decrease average individual
taxable income, the elasticity estimate could be upward-biased.
In Figure 4 in Section 4.4, I test the supposition that future tax increases (or decreases) are sig-
nificantly more common when individual taxable income has decreased in the past. The Figure
highlights that this baseline policy endogeneity is not driving the results in this paper. Nevertheless,
in order to alleviate potential policy endogeneity, I include various municipal-level covariates to the
model, such as municipal-level unemployment and employment rates and the level of net debt (per
capita). These variables have a presumable effect on total taxable income within a municipality,
as well as average individual taxable income. By including a set of municipal-level covariates and
regional income trends in the model, I can, at least to a sufficient extent, separate the possible
municipal and other regional-level effects from the individual-level behavioral responses.
Another concern is the possibility that individuals select into the “treatment” by changing their
municipality of residence. First, we might worry that individuals consistently move to municipalities
with lower (or higher) tax rates. However, with regard to identification in the ETI model, this is
not very relevant in itself.8
A more serious concern would be that changes in taxable income are systematically correlated with
8For example, if an individual moves to a municipality with a lower tax rate but does not change his/her current
job (or more precisely, taxable income does not change), ETI for this individual will be zero by definition, even though
the total income taxes paid are now lower than before. Thus, this kind of purely tax-motivated migration is not an
issue in this framework. Also, we might suspect that there is a classical selection problem in equation (2). The
conceivable selection bias comes from the possibility that individuals who prefer low income taxation choose to reside
in a municipality with a low tax rate. Preference for low income taxation is likely to be positively correlated with
taxable income, causing the elasticity estimate to be biased. However, as the empirical model in question is identified
by individual changes in both municipal tax rates and taxable income, this is not a very serious concern.
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the moving decision, and especially with the municipal tax rate in the destination municipality (i.e.
the tax rate instrument would be correlated with the transitory income component). For example,
a new, better paid job might be a good reason for moving to another municipality. At the same
time, it could be that municipalities with a lot of open highly paid vacancies have a relatively low or
high municipal tax rate, which would bias the elasticity estimate. This is a relevant concern in the
Finnish case, as the municipal income tax rates are typically below the average in high-wage regions
such as the capital city area (Helsinki-Espoo-Vantaa-Kauniainen).
Therefore, in the baseline empirical specification, I drop individuals who change their municipality
of residence between t and t + k in order to avoid mechanical correlation between the instrument
and the transitory income component. The downside of this approach is that it does not take into
account the potential but somewhat unlikely effect of moving and decreasing (increasing) income
because of a municipal tax increase (decrease) in the base-year municipality of residence. In other
words, the model excluding individuals with changes in the municipality of residence does not include
all imaginable behavioral margins.
Overall, utilizing changes in flat municipal income tax rates provides a new way of constructing
instruments for the changes in net-of-tax rates which avoids many of the critical issues related to
income-based predicted net-of-tax rates. However, applying regional variation arguably requires
more detailed consideration of regional income trends and other regional characteristics. I further
study the significance of different controls in Section 5. In addition, in Section 5.2, I use the
standard predicted net-of-tax rate instrument proposed in Gruber and Saez (2002), and the modified
instrument using lagged base-year income proposed in Weber (2014) to estimate ETI in Finland.
4.4 Descriptive statistics
Figure 3 describes the relationship between changes in taxable income and changes in municipal tax
rates. In the Figure, I plot the coefficients from a regression where I regress log changes in individual
taxable income with dummy variables of different percentage point changes in the municipal tax rate
using three-year differences and controlling for county-year fixed effects. The dummy variable for
zero changes in the municipal tax rate is omitted from the regression. Thus in the Figure, the point
on the vertical dash line denotes the omitted zero changes, which represent the comparison group
to other percentage point changes in municipal tax rates.
From Figure 3 we can see that relative changes in taxable income are, on average, more negative the
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larger the positive changes in municipal tax rates are. In other words, positive changes in municipal
tax rates induce negative changes in taxable income. This reduced-form type evidence indicates that
individuals respond to incentives created by changes in municipal tax rates.9 In addition, Figure 3
graphically illustrates the extent of municipal tax rate variation for the baseline estimation sample
included in the Figure.
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Notes: Figure shows the average log changes in taxable income for different percentage-point changes in municipal tax rates.
Figure presents the average αj coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from a regression 4ln(TI)t,i = γ +
∑2
j=−1 αj4τj +
β(Y EARt ∗COUNTYi) + vt,i, where 4ln(TI)t,i is the change in taxable income between t and t+ 3 for individual i and 4τj
denote dummy variables for different percentage point changes in the municipal rate between t and t + 3. Municipal tax rate
changes occur in 0.25 percentage point intervals. Base-year county*year dummies are included to control for different income
trends in different parts of the country in different years. The estimation sample includes individuals with base-year taxable
income above 20,000 euros. Individuals under the age of 24 and over the age of 60 are not included in the sample, and the
sample is limited to individuals whose municipality of residence and marital status are unchanged between t and t+ 3.
Figure 3: Changes in taxable income for different changes in the municipal tax rate
Figure 4 shows the coefficients from a regression where I regress log changes in taxable income
between t and t+3 with different future percentage point changes in the municipal tax rate between
t+3 and t+6. This allows me to test whether municipal tax rate changes are determined based on
past development of individual taxable income. For example, if municipalities respond to a decrease
in taxable income in the past by increasing the municipal tax rate in the future, we should see
that future tax increases are significantly more common when there is a decreasing trend in average
taxable income, and vice versa.
9Column (10) of Table 10 in the Appendix shows the regression results for the reduced-form model where log
changes in taxable income are regressed with log changes in the municipal net-of-tax rate using the baseline empirical
specification.
16
Figure 4 does not support this policy endogeneity channel. There are no statistically different
changes in taxable income for different future changes in the municipal tax rate. In other words,
past income development is not driving the changes in municipal tax rates. Nevertheless, the point
estimates are slightly more negative for larger changes in the municipal tax rate, and vice versa.
Therefore, in order to take into account possible policy endogeneity, I add municipal-level covariates
in the preferred empirical specification.
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Notes: Figure shows the average log changes in taxable income for different future percentage-point changes in munici-
pal tax rates. Figure presents the average αj coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from a regression 4ln(TI)t,i =
γ +
∑2
j=−1 αj4τFj + β(Y EARt ∗COUNTYi) + vt,i where 4ln(TI)t,i is the change in taxable income between t and t+ 3 for
individual i and 4τFj denote dummy variables for different future percentage point changes in the municipal rate between t+3
and t+ 6. Municipal tax rate changes occur in 0.25 percentage point intervals. Base-year county*year dummies are included to
control for different income trends in different parts of the country in different years. The estimation sample includes individuals
with base-year taxable income above 20,000 euros. Individuals under the age of 24 and over the age of 60 are not included in
the sample, and the sample is limited to individuals whose municipality of residence and marital status are unchanged between
t and t+ 3.
Figure 4: Changes in taxable income and future changes in the municipal tax rate
4.5 Empirical specification
I estimate different variations of the following equation using a two-stage least squares estimator
4ln(TI)t,i =α1 + e4ln(1− τ)t,i + α2Bt,i + α3Mt,m +4εt,i (4)
In equation (4), 4ln(TI)t,i is the change in taxable income between t and t + k for individual i.
4ln(1 − τ)t,i is the change in the net-of-tax rate instrumented with the change in the municipal
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net-of-tax rate. Thus e is the coefficient of interest, the average elasticity of taxable income with
respect to the net-of-tax rate. The baseline time horizon used is three years (t + 3 − t), which is
customary in the literature.
Base-year characteristics Bt,i control for observed individual and regional heterogeneity affecting
changes in taxable income. Bt,i includes year dummies, age, age squared, county of residence,
sex, level of education (highest degree), marital status, size of the household and dummy variables
indicating whether the individual has received any taxable social security benefits in the base year.10
I also include interaction terms of sex and other controls in the model (age, education, household size
and marital status). Importantly, I also add county-year fixed effects, which account for different
income trends in different parts of the country at different times.11
To control for the possible policy endogeneity of the net-of-tax rate instrument, I add municipal-level
(m) characteristics Mt,m to the estimable equation. Mt,m includes base-year values of municipal-
level employment, unemployment, net migration and net loan positions. These variables reflect the
actual publicly available information that the decision-making bodies in each municipality have on
the local economy.
I limit the analysis to observations where base-year taxable income is above 20,000 euros. First, as in
previous ETI literature, I focus on the intensive margin behavioral responses. This emphasizes the
need for a relatively large income cut-off in the Finnish context. Many of the social security benefits
in Finland (e.g. unemployment benefits and sickness benefits) are regarded as taxable income, which
creates relatively low but positive taxable income also for individuals fully or partly outside the labor
force during the year. Second, income cut-off above 14,000 euros is needed in order to eliminate
any notable effect of the municipal earned income tax allowance on the net-of-tax rate instrument.
The allowance depends inversely on income, and therefore cause a mechanical correlation between
income and the net-of-tax rate for low-income individuals.
In addition, I drop people under the age of 24 and over the age of 60 out of the estimation sample.
Also, following earlier literature (e.g. Gruber and Saez (2002)), the analysis is limited to individuals
whose marital status is unchanged between the two years. Finally, in the baseline analysis, I drop
individuals who change their municipality of residence between t and t + k. However, the sample
10Social security benefits include unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, parental leave benefits and study
grants. The marital status dummies include married couples, unmarried couples, singles, divorced singles and wid-
ows/widowers. There are 21 counties in Finland. Figure 5 in the Appendix presents a map of counties in Finland.
11As the variation in municipal tax rates is not based on base-year income of the individual, there is no explicit need
to include base-year (or lagged) income variables to the right-hand side of equation (4). This is a typical strategy in
previous ETI literature. Also, as underlined in recent literature (see e.g. Weber (2014)), base-year income controls
are endogenous and should not be included in the first place.
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includes individuals whose municipality of residence changed due to a municipality merger.12
5 Results
5.1 Main results
Table 3 shows the results for the three-year difference model with different specifications. First,
column (1) shows the average ETI estimate with only year dummies included in the regression. This
elasticity estimate is 0.66 and statistically significant at the 1% level. In column (2), I add county
dummies to the estimable equation, which decreases the estimate to 0.46 and increases precision.
Column (3) shows that adding individual-level base year controls further decreases the estimate to
0.36.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ln(TI) ln(TI) ln(TI)t ln(TI) ln(TI)
Elasticity (ln(1− τ)) 0.661*** 0.461*** 0.364*** 0.226** 0.160*
(0.211) (0.142) (0.132) (0.100) (0.095)
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County F.E. No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Base-year controls No No Yes Yes Yes
County-Year F.E. No No No Yes Yes
Municipal-level controls No No No No Yes
Observations 726,603 726,603 725,859 725,859 724,281
Notes: Heteroscedasticity-consistent and municipal-level clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Table shows the results for the baseline ETI estimations. Columns (1)-(5): Equation (4) estimated using the baseline estimation
sample and a three-year difference window using different sets of regional and individual control variables for 1995-2007. Baseline
sample includes individuals aged 25-60 years, base-year income above 20,000€ and whose municipality of residence and marital
status are unchanged between t and t+ 3.
Table 3: ETI estimates
As discussed above, using municipal-level income tax rate variation to obtain individual-level elas-
ticity estimates presumably requires more extensive regional controlling. First, column (4) adds
county-year dummies to the model, which control for different income trends in different parts of the
country in different years. Taking this regional heterogeneity into account decreases the elasticity
estimate to 0.23.
Column (5) of Table 3 shows my preferred empirical specification with both county-year fixed ef-
fects and municipal-level controls included. As mentioned before, controlling for municipal-level
12As a sensitivity check, I also estimate the model with movers included. For the model including the movers, Bt,i
also contains a dummy variable denoting whether an individual has changed his/her municipality of residence between
t and t+ k, and the interaction terms of the moving dummy and the county of residence in t+ k.
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characteristics is needed in order to take into account municipal-level economic circumstances that
might be correlated with both changes in municipal tax rates and individual income. After adding
municipal controls, the average ETI estimate is 0.16 and statistically significant at the 10% level.13
The preferred average ETI estimate of 0.16 is in line with many previous ETI studies (see Saez
et al. (2012)). Furthermore, the estimate is of similar magnitude with other recent studies from
the Nordic countries (e.g. Chetty et al. (2011) and Kleven and Schultz (2014) for Denmark, and
Thoresen and Vattø (2013) for Norway), although the estimate is among the largest ones.14 In
general, the estimated ETI implies that marginal income tax rates have a relatively small effect on
taxable income at the intensive margin. In addition, the welfare effects are moderate at the most.
Using the average marginal tax rate (0.39) and the standard formula for the excess burden presented
in for example Chetty (2009), the ETI estimate of 0.16 implies a marginal excess burden of around
10%.
Finally, in order to characterize the heterogeneity of the average ETI, Table 7 in the Appendix
shows the results for different subgroups of taxpayers. First, columns (1) and (2) show the estimates
separately for men and women. The results show that the point estimate for men (0.14) is slightly
smaller than for women (0.22), indicating practically no significant differences in average responses
between the sexes. Second, columns (3)-(5) show the results for low-income (10,000-25,000 euros),
middle-income (25-40k) and high-income individuals (over 40k). The results show that low-income
(point estimate 0.31) individuals seem to be somewhat more responsive than middle-income (0.15)
and high-income (0.14) individuals. The larger estimate for low-income earners is consistent with
previous literature, but the estimate in this particular context could be somewhat upwards biased
due to the mechanical correlation between the earned income tax allowance and taxable income for
individuals with taxable income below 14,000 €. However, in contrast to many previous studies, I
do not find the ETI to be larger among high-income earners compared to middle-income individuals.
13The F-statistics for the first stage of the two-stage least squares routine are very large and highly significant in
all specifications. The first-stage result for the preferred specification is presented in column (9) of Table 10 in the
Appendix.
14One potential reason for the slightly larger point estimate is the different identification strategy. Instead of using
the predicted net-of-tax rate, I use changes in flat municipal tax rates as the net-of-tax rate instrument. If the predicted
net-of-tax rate instrument provides downwards-biased estimates, it is likely to receive smaller estimates when using
this instrument. However, it could be that the estimated average ETI in this study would decrease if, for example,
additional municipal-level controls were available, but it is in general very difficult to conjecture the potential effect
possible omitted controls on the estimate.
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5.2 Alternative specifications and robustness checks
5.2.1 Subcomponents of taxable income
In addition to average ETI, extensive register data allow me to characterize the structure of the
overall elasticity by studying how the subcomponents of ETI, such as working hours and deduction
behavior, react to changes in tax rates. Currently, there are only a limited number of studies available
that systematically analyze the responsiveness of different components of ETI.15 However, detailed
knowledge of “the anatomy of behavioral response” (Slemrod (1996)) is useful when designing an
income tax system and the detailed structure of tax reforms, especially in the light of minimizing the
excess burden of income taxation. It is rather difficult for the policymaker to influence deep individual
utility arguments, such as the opportunity cost of working (Piketty et al. (2014)). However, for
example, it is easier to influence tax deduction behavior through minor adjustments to regulations.
Table 8 in the Appendix presents the results for the subcomponent analysis. First, column (1) shows
the elasticity of gross earned income subject to taxation. Compared to taxable income, gross earned
income is a broader income concept, as it is subject to less deductions. The point estimate for the
gross earned income elasticity is 0.14, which is slightly smaller than the baseline ETI estimate of
0.16. This tentatively suggests that tax deductions are responsive to changes in tax rates.
Second, columns (2) and (3) present the estimates for monthly wages and monthly working hours,
respectively. Data on wages and hours come from the Structure of Earnings statistics collected by
Statistics Finland. Monthly wage rates include both regular and irregular earnings, and monthly
working hours include regular hours and overtime working hours. The point estimates for both the
wage rate and working hours are negative and insignificant. This suggests that both work effort and
labor supply are not responsive to income taxation.
However, the estimates for monthly wages and working hours need to be interpreted with caution.
First, register-based information on monthly wages and monthly hours are reported to Statistics
Finland by a selected sample of employers with more than five workers. Second, the information
on working hours and wages is collected only for full-time workers. Third, reported working hours
15Blomquist and Selin (2010) estimate the elasticity of the hourly wage rate in Sweden, and find a significant wage
rate response. Doerrenberg et al. (2014) show that tax deductions are responsive to tax rate changes in Germany.
Also, Kleven and Schultz (2014) report that capital income components of taxable income are more responsive than
earned income in Denmark. Previous US literature shows that a large proportion of the behavioral response of high-
income individuals has been in the form of tax avoidance via income-shifting (see for example Saez et al. (2012)).
Harju and Matikka (2014) show that a similar result holds for the owners of non-listed businesses in Finland. In
addition, the US literature has shown that charitable giving, which is tax deductible in the US, responds to changes
in marginal tax rates (see for example Bakija and Heim (2011)).
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and monthly wages might not precisely measure the actual working hours or wage rates of each
individual worker, especially if wages are not directly based on actual hours worked (for example for
workers with a fixed monthly salary with no overtime compensations). In addition, wage rates and
working hours are mainly based on the situation in October in each year, which might not reflect
the actual yearly responses, especially with respect to more irregular components such as overtime
work. Nevertheless, given the limitations of the Structure of Earnings data, I find no evidence of
significant effort (wage rate) or labor supply (working hours) responses to tax rate changes.
To further study the potential effect of other components, I estimate elasticities for fringe benefits
and specific tax deductions. The data on taxable fringe benefits and tax deductions come from
the Finnish Tax Administration. Column (4) of Table 8 presents the elasticity estimate for taxable
fringe benefits. The responsiveness of fringe benefits seems to be relatively large (elasticity of 0.53),
although the effect is imprecisely measured. This evidence tentatively supports the view that the
response might come through more irregular earnings channels.
Columns (5) and (6) show the estimates for work-related expense and commuting expense deductions.
Work-related expense deductions and commuting deductions are described in detail in Table 9 in
the Appendix. Both deductions appear to be moderately responsive, but the estimates are again
insignificantly different from zero (due to the relatively small number of available observations in the
data). The signs of both deduction responses are intuitive, however. Basic taxable income theory
predicts that the amount of tax deductions will increase as the net-of-tax rate decreases, and vice
versa. Overall, given the data limitations, this evidence together with the relatively large fringe
benefit response tentatively indicate that the overall ETI is driven by tax deduction behavior and
irregular earnings rather than conspicuous changes in labor supply or work effort.
5.2.2 Robustness checks
Table 10 in the Appendix presents the results for robustness and sensitivity checks for the baseline
ETI model in column (5) of Table 3. First, column (1) of Table 10 shows the estimate for the
baseline specification including individuals who move from one municipality to another between t
and t+3. The ETI estimate increases to 0.56 when movers are included in the sample. This implies
notable effects for individuals who changed their municipality of residence. As mentioned in Section
4.3, the elasticity estimate is presumably larger for movers due to mechanical correlation between
the instrument and transitory income. As a further robustness check, I also estimate the model
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without individuals who move to the largest county in Finland, which includes the capital city area
(Uusimaa). The average point estimate for this model is 0.40, which is lower than the estimate
when all movers are included. This supports the notion that mechanical correlation between the
lower-than-average municipal tax rates and higher wage levels in larger cities bias the results when
moving individuals are included to the model.
Column (2) shows the elasticity estimate with base-year taxable income weights. Income-weighting
is used in many earlier ETI studies (see for example Gruber and Saez (2002)). The income-weighted
point estimate (0.15) does not significantly differ from the unweighted baseline estimate. Column
(3) shows the ETI estimate when the base-year income cut-off is lowered from 20,000 € to 15,000 €.
The estimate with the lower cut-off increases slightly to 0.20, but the difference is not statistically
significant.
Columns (4) and (5) present the results for one-year and five-year differences, respectively. The ETI
estimate for the one-year difference model is 0.01. This implies that a one-year difference is too short
to estimate the effect of changes in net-of-tax rates on changes in taxable income in this context. The
estimate for the five-year difference model is similar in size (0.11) to the baseline three-year model.
However, the estimate is more imprecise. These results imply that the baseline three-year estimation
window is long enough to capture potential changes in behavior but not too long to lose identifying
variation, which tends to weaken when longer time periods are used. The latter is especially relevant
when using the relatively small changes in municipal tax rates as the identifying variation.
Columns (6) and (7) estimate the model using predicted net-of-tax rate instruments typically used
in the literature. Column (6) shows the estimate when using the standard Gruber and Saez (2002)
type predicted net-of-tax rate instrument discussed above in Section 4.3. Similarly as in Blomquist
and Selin (2010), I get a negative point estimate when applying this instrument (-0.10). Column
(7) shows the results for a model where income variables from period t− 1 are used to calculate the
net-of-tax rate instrument, as opposed to base-year t income in the standard predicted net-of-tax
rate instrument. This alternative strategy is proposed in Weber (2014). The point estimate for
this model is also negative (-0.41), and more imprecisely measured than with the Gruber and Saez
instrument. The sample in these estimations is limited to observations where all the instruments
(Gruber and Saez, Weber, municipal instrument) are non-missing.
The results when using the predicted net-of-tax rate instruments imply that the negligible variation
in progressive central government tax rates is not suitable for identifying behavioral responses. As
23
shown in Table 4 in the Appendix, central government income tax rates have decreased in all income
classes in a similar manner. However, the relative tax decrease was slightly larger for middle and
low-income earners compared to high-income earners. Thus we get biased elasticity estimates if
high-income earners have even slightly faster non-tax-related income growth that we cannot fully
take into account in the identification strategy.16 This is a particular issue for predicted net-of-tax
rate instruments that are based on base-year or lagged taxable income. This issue is also supported
by the data. The estimates derived using predicted net-of-tax rate instruments increase markedly
when I drop individuals with taxable income over 45,000 € in the base-year from the estimation
sample. For this sample the point estimate is 0.05 for the Gruber and Saez instrument and -0.19
for the Weber instrument. This evidence indicates that the counterintuitive negative elasticity is
mostly driven by high-income earners in the top tax bracket. In comparison, the ETI estimates are
similar for middle-income and high-income individuals when using the municipal tax rate instrument
which is unrelated to individual taxable income (see Table 7 in the Appendix). To summarize, these
observations demonstrate the issues related to income-based predicted net-of-tax rate instruments,
and highlight that the municipal tax rate variation is the principal source of identifying tax rate
variation in the Finnish context.
Finally, columns (8)-(10) show the OLS, first-stage and reduced-form results, respectively. First,
column (8) shows that the OLS estimate for the ETI model provides a highly counterintuitive
result with a large negative point estimate (-2.8), which highlights the need for a valid instrumental
variable. Column (9) shows that the first-stage results are strong. The first-stage estimate implies
that a 1% increase in the municipal tax rate accounts for a 1.5% increase in the overall net-of-tax
rate. Given the general pattern of the central government tax rate changes and the three-year time
window, this estimate is reasonable in size. Also, as mentioned before, the F-test statistics for the
first-stage models are large and highly significant in all specifications (234 in column (9)). Column
(10) shows the result for the reduced-form model where log changes in taxable income are regressed
directly with the log changes in the net-of-municipal tax rate. The results show that, on average,
individuals respond changes in the municipal tax rate.
16As in many other countries, the income shares of high-income individuals have in general increased in Finland in
1995-2007, see for example Riihelä et al. (2010).
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6 Conclusions
In this study I analyze the key tax policy parameter, the elasticity of taxable income (ETI), using
Finnish panel data from 1995-2007. I use variation in flat municipal income tax rates as an instrument
for the changes in overall net-of-tax rates. The flat municipal tax rate is not a function of individual
taxable income in any period. Also, changes in municipal income tax rates occur throughout the
income distribution. Therefore, using the municipal tax rate instrument overcomes many critical
issues in earlier studies, such as non-tax-related changes in the shape of the income distribution and
mean reversion of income. The novel approach of utilizing changes in municipal tax rates illustrates
that different institutional features can provide useful and practical identifying variation in terms of
estimating sufficient statistics for welfare analysis.
My preferred estimate for the average ETI in Finland is 0.16. The preferred empirical specification
includes extensive regional and municipal-level controlling. In addition, I present graphical evidence
showing that potential policy endogeneity of municipal income tax rate changes is not driving the
results.
The preferred estimate is in line with many previous studies from other countries, including recent
evidence from other Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway, Denmark). However, the estimate is among
the largest ones for the Nordic countries. Overall, using an alternative identification strategy, this
study confirms the observation from earlier studies that ETI can be relatively small even if the
average marginal tax rate is high. In addition to individual preferences, this is likely driven by a
broad tax base and relatively limited opportunities for tax avoidance and evasion for regular income
earners in Finland, as well as in other Nordic countries (see Kleven (2014)).
As an additional analysis, I provide tentative evidence that working hours and wage rates respond
less than tax deductions and more irregular forms of compensation such as fringe benefits. This
suggests that the overall behavioral response is not driven by profound economic parameters such as
the opportunity cost of working. However, the results from the subcomponent analysis need to be
interpreted with caution. It is possible that register-based data on working hours and wage rates are
not sufficient to adequately measure the labor supply margin. Thus, in future work, we need richer
data on various behavioral margins in order to provide more accurate conclusions on the effect of
different types of behavioral changes on the overall elasticity of taxable income.
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Appendix
Figure 5: Finnish municipalities and counties in 2007 (Source: National Land Survey of Finland)
29
Year Taxable income (in euros) Marginal tax rate Year Taxable income (in euros) Marginal tax rate
1995 7,063-9,754 7 2001 11,100-14,296 14
9,754-12,110 17 14,296-19,678 18
12,110-17,155 21 19,678-30,947 24
17,155-26,910 27 30,947-54,661 30
26,910-47,934 33 54,661- 37
47,934- 39 2002 11,500-14,300 13
1996 7,232-9,923 7 14,300-19,700 17
9,923-12,278 17 19,700-30,900 23
12,278-17,492 21 30,900-54,700 29
17,492-27,415 27 54,700- 36
27,415-48,774 33 2003 11,600-14,400 12
48,774- 39 14,400-20,000 16
1997 7,568-10,259 6 20,000-31,200 22
10,259-12,782 16 31,200-55,200 28
12,782-18,164 20 55,200- 35
18,164-28,592 26 2004 11,700-14,500 11
28,592-50,456 32 14,500-20,200 15
50,456- 38 20,200-31,500 21
1998 7,737-10,428 6 31,500-55,800 27
10,428-13,119 16 55,800- 34
13,119-18,500 20 2005 12,000-15,400 10,5
18,500-29,096 26 15,400-20,500 15
29,096-51,466 32 20,500-32,100 20,5
51,466- 38 32,100-56,900 26,5
1999 7,905-10,596 5,5 56,900- 33,5
10,596-13,455 15,5 2006 12,200-17,000 9
13,455-18,837 19,5 17,000-20,000 14
18,837-29,601 25,5 20,000-32,800 19,5
29,601-52,466 31,5 32,800-58,200 25
52,461- 38 58,200- 32,5
2000 8,006-10,697 5 2007 12,400-20,400 9
10,697-13,623 15 20,400-33,400 19,5
13,623-19,005 19 33,400-60,800 24
19,005-29,937 25 60,800 - 32
29,937-52,979 31
52,979- 37,5
Notes: Table shows the nominal central government income tax rate schedules in 1995-2007. Finnish marks converted to euros
before 2002. In addition to central government taxes, the overall tax liability includes municipal taxes and social security
contributions which are not included in the Table.
Table 4: Central government income tax rate schedules in 1995-2007
30
Year Phase-in
threshold
1
Phase-in
threshold
2
Phase-out
threshold
Phase-in
rate 1
Phase-in
rate 2
Phase-out
rate
Max.
allowance
1995 3,364 - 13,455 0,05 - 0,05 336
1998 2,523 - 7,232 0,2 - 0,02 925
2001 2,523 - 12,614 0,35 - 0,035 1,648
2004 2,500 7,230 14,000 0,47 0,23 0,04 3,550
2007 2,500 7,230 14,000 0,49 0,26 0,04 3,250
Notes: Table shows the schedule for the earned income tax allowance in municipal taxation in 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2007.
Before 2002 (example year 1998): for all wage income earners, a certain amount is deducted from adjusted gross income (gross
earned income minus expense deductions) in municipal income taxation as an earned income tax allowance. The allowance is
20% (Phase-in rate 1) of income above 2,523 euros (Phase-in threshold 1). The maximum amount of the allowance is 1,648 euros
(Max. allowance). For income above 7,232 euros (Phase-out threshold), the allowance decreases by 2% (Phase-out rate). After
2002 (example year 2004): the allowance rate is 47% (Phase-in rate 1) of income between 2,500 euros (Phase-in threshold 1)
and 7,230 euros (Phase-in threshold 2). The allowance rate is 23% (Phase-in rate 2) of income above 7,230 euros. The maximum
amount of the allowance is 3,550 euros (Max. allowance). For income above 14,000 euros (Phase-out threshold), the allowance
decreases by 4% (Phase-out rate).
Table 5: Earned income tax allowance in municipal taxation in 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2007
Individuals
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Taxable earned income 3,116,040 20,893 28,275.61
Gross earned income 3,116,040 24,726 29,134.99
Total taxable income
(earned+capital income)
3,116,040 22,080 48,116.18
Age 3,127,819 42.06 9.46
Female 3,127,819 0.50 0.5
Size of the household 3,105,782 3.56 1.65
Municipal tax rate 3,127,340 17.95 0.77
Marginal tax rate 3,127,340 0.393 0.13
Commuting expense
deduction
3,111,906 332.60 859.57
Work-related expense
deduction
3,111,906 107.35 699.12
Fringe benefits 3,123,447 447.50 19,635.25
Monthly wage 1,398,846 2,320 1,233.83
Monthly working hours 1,397,291 156 32.77
Municipalities
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Municipal income tax rate 5,733 18.29 .77
Average individual taxable
income
5,734 12,933.40 2,868.85
Net loans position (per capita) 4,690 1,925.73 2,102.40
Employment rate 5,734 0.617 .075
Unemployment rate 5,726 0.141 .06
Net migration 5,676 -0.003 .011
Notes: Income variables in 2007 euros. Individual statistics are calculated for individuals aged 25-60. The average taxable
income within a municipality includes all individuals.
Table 6: Summary statistics (whole data), 1995-2007
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Men Women Small
income
(10k-25k)
Mid.
income
(25k-40k)
High
income
(>40k)
Elasticity 0.146 0.221** 0.308*** 0.149 0.139
(0.112) (0.111) (0.110) (0.108) (0.193)
Observations 459,847 264,434 561,118 331,984 134,627
Notes: Heteroscedasticity-consistent and municipal-level clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Table shows the results for the baseline ETI model for different types of individuals. Columns (1)-(-2): Equation (4) estimated
separately for men and women using the baseline estimation sample and a three-year difference window for 1995-2007. All
regressions include county-year fixed effects, base-year individual controls and municipal-level controls similarly as in column (5)
of Table 3. Sample includes individuals aged 25-60 years, base-year income above 20,000€, and whose municipality of residence
and marital status are unchanged between t and t+3. Columns (3)-(-5): Equation (4) estimated separately for individuals with
different base-year income using the baseline estimation sample and a three-year difference window for 1995-2007. All regressions
include county-year fixed effects, base-year individual controls and municipal-level controls similarly as in column (5) of Table
3. Sample includes individuals aged 25-60 years and whose municipality of residence and marital status are unchanged between
t and t+ 3.
Table 7: Heterogeneity of the average ETI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Gross
earned
income
Monthly
wage
Monthly
hours
Fringe
benefits
Work-
related
expenses
Commuting
expenses
Elasticity 0.137 -0.057 -0.112 0.534 -0.098 -0.643
(0.084) (0.073) (0.089) (0.635) (0.091) (1.052)
Observations 724,280 425,105 423,128 196,935 696,258 225,089
Notes: Heteroscedasticity-consistent and municipal-level clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Table shows the results for equation (4) estimated using log changes in different available subcomponents of taxable income
as the dependent variable. All regressions are estimated using a three-year difference window for 1995-2007. All regressions
includes county-year fixed effects, base-year individual controls and municipal-level controls similarly as in column (5) of Table 3.
Estimation sample includes individuals aged 25-60 years, base-year income above 20,000€, and whose municipality of residence
and marital status are unchanged between t and t + 3. Column (1): dependent variable is log change in gross earned income
subject to taxation. Column (2): dependent variable is log change in monthly earnings for full-time workers. Column (3):
dependent variable is log change in monthly working hours for full-time workers. Column (4): dependent variable is log change
in taxable fringe benefits. Column (5): dependent variable is log change in approved tax-deductible work-related expenses.
Column (6): dependent variable is log change in approved tax-deductible commuting expenses. Dependent variables in columns
(2)-(6) are described in more detail in Table 9 in the Appendix.
Table 8: Elasticity estimates for the subcomponents of taxable income
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Variable Description
Monthly wage rate (Kuukausiansio) Monthly earnings for full-time workers. Includes wages
from regular working hours and overtime work, and other
additional wage income and taxable fringe benefits.
Monthly working hours (Kokonaistyöaika) Working hours for full-time workers. Includes regular
working hours (4.35*regular weekly hours) and overtime
hours.
Fringe benefits (Luontoisedut) Taxable fringe benefits for a tax year, including realized
options. Fringe benefits include, for example, company
cars, phones, apartments, and meals provided by the
employer. Typically the value of taxable fringe benefits is
less than the face value of the good, for example, in the
case of luncheon vouchers provided by the employer.
Work-related expenses (Tulonhankkimisvähennys) The approved amount of tax-deductible work-related
expenses for a tax year. Usual work-related expenses
include, for example, the purchasing price of equipment
or tools such as work clothing and professional literature,
and office costs if a working space is not provided by the
employer. Only the amount exceeding a fixed sum can be
deducted (620 euros in 2012).
Commuting expenses (Kodin ja työpaikan välisten
matkakustannusten vähennys)
The approved amount of tax-deductible commuting
expenses for a tax year. Only the amount exceeding a
fixed sum can be deducted (600 euros in 2012). The
amount of the approved deduction depends on the mode
of transport (public transport, private vehicle or a
combination of the two).
Notes: Table describes the variables used to characterize the responsiveness of different subcomponents of taxable income
(Table 8 in the Appendix). Monthly wage rate and monthly working hours are from the Structure of Earnings statistics
(Palkkarakennetilasto), and fringe benefits, work-related expenses and commuting expenses are from the tax record statistics
produced by the Finnish Tax Administration. Detailed guidelines for tax deductions and fringe benefits are provided by the
Finnish Tax Administration on an annual basis. The Structure of Earnings statistics are based on a sample collected by Statistics
Finland. Structural statistics on wages and salaries describe hourly and monthly earnings, and the formation and distribution
of employees’ wages and salaries. The sample includes both private and public sector workers. The private sector includes
only workers in companies with five workers or more. The working hours and wage rate information is mainly based on the
situation in October each year. Information on wages and working hours is provided by employers. For more details, see
http://tilastokeskus.fi/til/pra/index_en.html (28.4.2015).
Table 9: Description of the subcomponents of taxable income
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Movers
included
Income-
weighted
Income
cut-off 15k
1-year 5-year
Elasticity 0.561*** 0.153 0.202** 0.010 0.112
(0.135) (0.097) (0.086) (0.095) (0.122)
Observations 772,611 724,281 1,027,729 1,029,266 475,517
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Gruber-
Saez
Weber OLS First-stage Reduced-
form
Elasticity -0.101*** -0.418*** -2.843***
(0.032) (0.101) (0.019)
d(1-municipal tax rate) 1.512*** 0.243*
(0.032) (0.141)
Observations 567,628 567,628 724,281 724,281 724,281
Notes: Heteroscedasticity-consistent and municipal-level clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Table shows the results for alternative specifications and robustness checks. All regressions include county-year fixed effects,
base-year individual controls and base-year municipal-level controls. All models are estimated for 1995-2007. Column (1):
Equation (4) estimated using a three-year difference window and a sample including individuals who change their municipality
of residence between t and t + 3. Regression includes county fixed effects for t + 3 for moving individuals. Estimation sample
includes individuals aged 25-60 years and base-year income above 20,000€ and whose marital status is unchanged between
t and t + 3. Column (2): Equation (4) estimated using the baseline estimation sample and a three-year difference window.
Estimates are weighted by taxable income in the base year. Estimation sample includes individuals aged 25-60 years, base-year
income above 20,000€, and whose municipality of residence and marital status are unchanged between t and t+3. Column (3):
Equation (4) estimated using the baseline estimation sample and a three-year difference window. Estimation sample includes
individuals aged 25-60 years and base-year income above 15,000€, and whose municipalitiy of residence and marital status are
unchanged between t and t + 3. Columns (4)-(5): Equation (4) estimated using the baseline estimation sample and one-year
and five-year difference windows, respectively. Estimation sample includes individuals aged 25-60 years and base-year income
above 20,000€, and whose municipalitiy of residence and marital status are unchanged between t and t + 1 in column (4),
and t and t + 5 in column (5). Column (6): Equation (4) estimated using the baseline estimation sample and a three-year
difference window, and the predicted net-of-tax rate instrument proposed in Gruber and Saez (2002). Base-year income is used
to predict the net-of-tax rates for both t and t+ 3 in the instrument. Estimation sample includes individuals aged 25-60 years,
base-year income and income in t − 1 above 20,000€, and whose municipalitiy of residence and marital status are unchanged
between t and t + 3. The estimation sample is restricted to observations with non-missing net-of-tax rate insturment for all
three types of instruments (the municipal tax rate instrument, Gruber-Saez instrument and Weber instrument). Column (7):
Equation (4) estimated using the baseline estimation sample and a three-year difference window, and the modified predicted
net-of-tax rate instrument proposed in Weber (2014). Taxable income in t− 1 is used to predict the net-of-tax rates for both t
and t+3 in the instrument. Estimation sample includes individuals aged 25-60 years and base-year income and income in t− 1
above 20,000€, and whose municipalitiy of residence and marital status are unchanged between t and t + 3. The estimation
sample is restricted to observations with non-missing net-of-tax rate insturment for all three types of instruments (the municipal
tax rate instrument, Gruber-Saez instrument and Weber instrument). Column (8): Equation (4) estimated using the baseline
estimation sample and a three-year difference window without any instrumental variables (OLS regression). Estimation sample
includes individuals aged 25-60 years, base-year income above 20,000€, and whose municipalitiy of residence and marital status
are unchanged between t and t + 3. Column (9): Results for the regression where log changes in net-of-tax rates are regressed
with log changes in municipal net-of-tax rates (first stage of the 2SLS). The model is estimated using the baseline estimation
sample and a three-year difference window. Estimation sample includes individuals aged 25-60 years, base-year income above
20,000€, and whose municipalitiy of residence and marital status are unchanged between t and t + 3. The F-test statistic for
the first-stage regression is 234.10. Column (10): Results for the regression where log changes in taxable income are regressed
with log changes in municipal net-of-tax rates (reduced-form regression). The model is estimated using the baseline estimation
sample and a three-year difference window. Estimation sample includes individuals aged 25-60 years, base-year income above
20,000€, and whose municipalitiy of residence and marital status are unchanged between t and t+ 3.
Table 10: Robustness and sensitivity checks
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